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ABSTRACT
This paper develops an empirical approach to estimate the equilibrium value of intermittent renewable
energy. We model an electricity system operator who optimizes the amount of generation capacity,
operating reserves, and demand curtailment potentially in the presence of large-scale solar facilities.
We use generator characteristics, solar output, demand and weather forecast data to estimate parameters
for southeastern Arizona. The deadweight loss of a 20% solar mandate is 79% of its $184/MWh average
cost. Unforecastable intermittency accounts for $12.5/MWh. At a $21/ton social cost of CO2 this mandate
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Electricity generation from fossil fuels is the single largest source of greenhouse gas (GhG)
emissions in the United States. Several U.S. states and foreign countries have enacted laws
to replace large fractions of their generation with renewables. Many observers consider solar
energy from photovoltaics (PV) to be a crucial part of future renewable energy.1 However, a
key potential problem with solar and other renewable energy sources is intermittency. Solar
facilities produce electricity intermittently, with by far the highest production levels during
clear, sunny periods. The intermittency from solar energy increases the variance of the
energy supply. This increased variance in turn adds risk to the electricity system because
the inability to provide adequate supply to meet demand can result in a system outage {
where a large number of customers do not receive power { with large welfare losses.2 The
intermittency and cyclic nature of renewable energy are seen as among the biggest hurdles
to their large-scale adoption.3
This paper develops an empirical approach to value renewable energy accounting for
intermittency. In conjunction with assumptions on the social cost of greenhouse gases, our
approach can be used to understand the optimal levels and types of renewable energy. A
simpler technique to value solar energy would be to use \levelized cost," which is the present
values of future average cost. The levelized cost of a solar plant is its installation and
maintenance costs divided by the total power it produces, discounted over its lifetime. The
social value of a solar plant would then be its environmental benets minus the dierence in
levelized cost between it and a fossil fuel plant. Yet, levelized cost dierences do not account
for the fact that the extra variability from having large-scale solar capacity may require grid
operators to engage in costly precautions. Specically, in the short run, operators may need
1Solar energy has recently attracted large amounts of venture capital funds, plant investment, and federal
and state government subsidies [see Glennon and Reeves, 2010].
2The impact of solar generation on electric system outage is similar to the impact of distressed nancial
institutions on nancial system risk. See Adrian and Brunnermeier [2010] for an analysis of nancial system
risk.
3For instance, a recent Texas state report [see SECO, 2011] identies intermittency, cost and surface area
as the three big challenges for solar energy, stating that \the solar resource's intermittency and cyclical nature
pose challenges for integrating solar at a large scale into the existing energy infrastructure." Joskow [2010]
notes that the value of renewable energy may be very dierent accounting for intermittency.
1to schedule additional reserve generation to avoid a system outage. In the long run, they may
need to invest in backup fossil fuel generation capacity to be used at times when demand is
high but solar output is low. These eects are counterbalanced by the fact that solar plants
tend to produce during peak consumption periods, which increases their value, as they oset
generation from high marginal cost plants.
The extent to which dierent aspects of intermittency balance out is unknown and de-
pends critically on how a particular renewable energy source aects optimal choices of gen-
erator scheduling, operating reserves and backup capacity. These decisions in turn depend
crucially on three factors: (1) the variability of the source including the extent to which
the variability correlates with demand; (2) the extent to which output from the source is
forecastable; and (3) the costs of building backup generation. These general issues of in-
termittency for renewable power are well understood. A number of recent studies seek to
quantify the potential importance of intermittency by considering one of these issues in depth.
Some studies focus on the time-varying generation prole of renewable energy [see Borenstein,
2008, Denholm and Margolis, 2007, Joskow, 2010, Cullen, 2010b]; others model intermittency
and its impact on operating reserves [see GE Energy, 2008, Mills and Wiser, 2010, Helman
et al., 2011] and nally some deal with backup capacity investment [see Campbell, 2011,
Hansen, 2008, Ho et al., 2008, Skea et al., 2008]. By combining these three central factors
in one model, we derive an overall economic assessment of the value of large-scale renewable
generation.
Our approach calculates the equilibrium social costs of intermittency from renewable
sources by endogenizing optimal policies as a function of renewable capacity. We use this
approach to evaluate solar energy mandates in southeastern Arizona. We argue that our
optimizing approach has important implications for evaluating intermittency costs. In par-
ticular, we nd that if the planner did not change decision-making policies for operating
reserves, demand curtailment, and backup investment when large-scale solar is adopted then
the welfare cost of solar would be almost 10 times as high as under our optimizing approach,
mostly due to high system outage probabilities. Even if the planner adopted heuristic backup
capacity and reserve strategies that have been proposed for solar, welfare costs would still
2be over 3 times as high. Our method could also be used to examine the equilibrium value
of other renewable technologies such as wind power, as well as how developments such as
real-time pricing and improvements in energy storage technology aect the value of renewable
technologies.
The starting point of our approach is Section 4 of Joskow and Tirole [2007], who model
a system operator of an electricity market who seeks to maximize the expected discounted
present value (DPV) of welfare when faced with fossil fuel generators that can suddenly fail.4
Our model builds on this paper by modeling renewable energy intermittency as similar to
the unexpected failure of a traditional generator; by modeling variability and uncertainty in
demand; and by using the empirical distribution of generator characteristics.
In our model, the system operator is faced with a xed retail price and level of solar
generation capacity, as specied by a state-mandated renewable portfolio standard (RPS). At
time 0 the operator chooses how many new fossil fuel generators to build. The operator also
sets the price for \curtailment contracts," which allow certain exible customers, typically
industrial users, to be paid not to consume electricity in periods of high demand. Each period,
which is one hour, the operator is faced with a distribution of demand, and in the presence
of renewables, a joint distribution of demand and renewable output. These distributions
are derived from the previous day's weather forecasts. Renewable output can uctuate at
high frequency within the hour. Observing the distribution, the operator must then decide
how many generators to schedule for generation and reserves and also how much demand to
curtail, if any.
We apply our model to the portion of the electric grid operated by Tucson Electric
Power (TEP), a regulated, investor-owned utility whose coverage area roughly consists of
southeastern Arizona. We obtained data for the Tucson area on generator heat rates, fuel
prices, retail electricity prices, line losses, demand at the hourly level, solar output at the
5-minute level, and day-ahead weather forecasts; as well as national data on capacity costs,
prices of spinning reserves, generator outages and system outage events. We estimate the
predictable and unpredictable components of demand and renewable outputs by regressing
4We use the terms \system operator" and \planner" interchangeably.
3demand and renewable outputs on the weather forecast for that hour made the previous
day,5 using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model to capture correlations in the
unforecastable components of these processes. To our knowledge, our study is the rst to
use weather forecast data to separate intermittency into its forecastable and unforecastable
components; and the rst to formalize reserve operations in an economic model that is taken
to data. We assume that demand has constant elasticity up to some maximum reservation
price and calibrate both the elasticity and reservation price from the literature. We recover
most of the other parameters with simple estimation techniques.
Our model and application have four central limitations. First, we do not model any
dynamic linkages from period to period, as would occur with start-up costs for generators,
for instance.6 Second, we solve for the planner solution and hence do not model the impact
of oligopoly power in the generation market.7 Third, we do not model imports or exports
outside of the local market, which can serve to reduce the variability of net demand, and
hence lower the costs of intermittency. Finally, we use data only from a single solar site.
Note also that we do not structurally estimate demand. One could potentially recover
the demand curve by a structural estimation process that would match the actual level of
operating reserves to predicted values. However, we believe that it would be somewhat
problematic to assume that current TEP decisions reect optimizing behavior within the
context of our model and hence that it is more credible to take these parameters from the
literature.8
Using the estimated parameters of the model, we solve for the optimal policies under
several counterfactual scenarios, involving dierent levels of solar capacity and assumptions
5Electricity system operators commonly schedule operating reserves one day ahead. For example, the
system operator for the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) obtains operating reserves for each
hour in one-day-ahead procurement auctions.
6Cullen [2010a] estimates a dynamic model of start-up costs for generators. A similar model would hugely
complicate our analysis.
7It is possible to design mechanisms that would generate the equilibrium of our model.
8TEP is subject to rate of return regulation by the Arizona Corporation Commission. This form of
regulation has the potential to introduce ineciency, for example due to weak incentives to hold down costs
of generation and of providing operating reserves. This regulatory eect is known as X-ineciency. Wolfram
[2005] nds evidence that non-regulated merchant power producers operate generation units at lower cost
than do regulated investor-owned utilities. Furthermore, the TEP system operator may act in a more risk
averse manner than predicted by our optimization model, whether due to career concerns or in response to
regulatory penalties for system outage.
4about forecastability. The optimal solution involves balancing very low probability but very
costly system outages against the certain cost of additional operating reserves. Simulation
of very low probability events can be computationally very time consuming. We develop a
simulation procedure that oversamples multiple generator failures by summing over dierent
number of failures and then simulating which generators fail given that a certain number fail.
Under the assumption that solar PV capacity costs are $5/W, the levelized cost of solar
generation in Tucson is $184/MWh (18.4 cents/KWh).9 This is $126/MWh higher than the
levelized cost for a new combined cycle natural gas unit.10 Our model, which incorporates
optimizing behavior of the system operator, nds that the true social cost of renewable
energy is higher than the levelized cost dierence and increasing in the level of solar capacity.
Specically, RPS policies of 10, 20 and 30% implemented solely with solar PV would impose
equilibrium costs of $138.8, $145.9, and $150.5 per MWh of solar generation respectively,
not accounting for the benet of CO2 reduction. The upward slope is due to the increasing
substitution from low cost generators and the increasing need to construct backup fossil
fuel generators. With solar capacity, demand-side management in the form of curtailment
contracts increases in periods with high demand and low solar output, leading to a higher
oered price on these contracts. Re-optimizing policies is very important in making large-
scale solar feasible: a planner who adopts a common heuristic approach for choosing backup
capacity and managing operating reserves in response to a solar mandate would face an
exorbitantly high cost of $677.2/MWh for a 20% RPS, due to the average system outage
probability rising from 0.006% to 1.1%.
Without unforecastable intermittency, the equilibrium costs of the 20% RPS would drop
from $145.9 to $133.4 per MWh. In contrast, if solar energy were fully dispatchable, costs
would drop to $89.8/MWh and if capacity costs fell to $2/W, equilibrium costs would drop
to $35.5/MWh. If CO2 reductions are valued at $21 per ton as mandated by recent U.S.
government regulatory rules,11 the 10% RPS would be welfare neutral with a capacity cost
9Throughout this paper we use total installed cost for solar PV capacity. Total installed cost includes the
cost of PV panels, installation cost, and lifetime balance-of-system costs.
10See EIA [2011].
11See EPA [2010].
5of $1.38/W and the 30% RPS would be welfare neutral with a capacity cost of $1.26/W.
The remainder of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 provides a background on
the electricity market. Section 3 discusses the model; Section 4 the data, estimation and
computation; and Section 5 the results. Section 6 concludes. On-line Appendix B provides
background on system operations and the electricity market in Tucson.
2 Solar Energy and Intermittency
Solar PV systems utilize panels of materials (such as silicon) that convert solar radiation into
direct current (DC) electricity, coupled with inverters that convert DC current to alternating
current (AC) that is used by customers [see NREL, 2011]. Electricity generation from solar
PV panels varies with solar insolation, a measure of energy from sunlight. Higher solar
insolation yields more PV generation, holding everything else constant. Most solar PV panels
in the northern hemisphere { including those for which we have data { are mounted to face
south at a xed tilt, with the tilt based on latitude. There are also single-axis tracking
systems in which the panels are typically rotated to track the motion of the sun through the
day, and double-axis systems in which both the angle of panels and the direction in which
panels face are controllable.
To illustrate the issues of intermittency, Figures 1 and 2 show southeastern Arizona
demand and solar PV output in solid lines, for Apr. and Aug. 15, 2008 respectively.12 Demand
(in our data and in the gures) is at the hourly level and solar output at the ve minute
level. With dotted lines, Figures 1 and 2 also show the hourly mean forecasted demand and
output using day ahead weather forecasts.13 Because southeastern Arizona power demand
is driven by air conditioning, it peaks during hot and sunny periods; but sunny periods also
have a lot of solar production. Thus, solar output correlates positively with demand during
the daytime. Figures 1 and 2 also illustrate that the correlation of solar output and demand
is not perfect; daily peak demand tends to occur later in the day than peak solar output.
Moreover, particularly in August, the solar output has large uctuations that last only a
12The solar PV output is for a 1.536 KW test facility near the Tucson International Airport.
13We provide details on our forecast methodology in Section 4.
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few minutes at a time, resulting from clouds. On one hand, the positive correlation between
solar output and load will increase the value of solar production because production occurs
when demand, and hence marginal costs of generation, are high. On the other hand, the
unforecastable intermittency in solar production will lower its value.
3 Model
3.1 Overview
We develop a model of electricity generation, system operations and the demand for power.
In our model, at time T = 0, the regulator exogenously chooses the level of solar capacity
and the retail price of electricity, p.14 Observing the solar capacity and existing fossil fuel
generators, the system operator decides on capacity investment for new generation units. We
assume that the new generation units, solar panels, and existing fossil fuel generators all last
14We assume p is xed, consistent with the relatively inexible retail pricing observed in most U.S. electricity
markets. It is possible to relax this assumption to understand the relationship between real time pricing and
the equilibrium value of renewables, among other questions.
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until year T = 25. The system operator also chooses a price for curtailment contracts, which
are xed over a year.
Following the choice of curtailment contracts, the system operator is faced with a sequence
of short-run production periods, each of which represents a particular hour of a particular day
of the year. Each day the operator obtains 24 weather forecasts corresponding to the hours
of the subsequent day. Using these weather forecasts, the operator computes the forecastable
distribution of the solar output and load for each of these 24 periods. The operator also
receives a report of which generators will be unavailable due to scheduled maintenance at
each period. The operator then chooses which generators to schedule for production and
reserves for each hour as well as how much load to curtail from the set of users who have
signed up for curtailment contracts.
During each short-run period { and a day after the operator choice of generation and
reserves { generator failures, solar output levels, and load are realized. Load takes on one
value for each period, while solar output varies multiple times during each period, to max-
8imally use our solar data which are at the 5-minute level. We can divide the realizations
for each 5-minute interval into three cases. First, load could be less than the sum of the
solar output and the realized output (from generators that have not failed) net of line losses.
In this case, the system operator will reduce the rate of generation for one or more units
to balance output with load. Second, load could be more than the output (also net of line
losses), but less than output plus reserves. In this case, the system operator will move some
of the capacity from reserves to production. Finally, load could be more than output plus
reserves. In this (hopefully rare) case, a system outage occurs and results in a fraction of
customers losing power, due to the system operator initiating an involuntary cut-o of power
to some customers, to avoid a complete system collapse. Let doutage denote the product of the
fraction of customer who lose power times the number of periods for which they lose power.
The system operator makes all decisions in order to maximize the expected discounted
value of future total surplus with a discount factor . We assume that there are no linkages
from period to period, as would occur with ramping constraints or start-up costs, for instance,
implying that the short-term decisions of the operator have no dynamic consequences. More-
over, the same time periods in the year are repeated for each year of the T-year time horizon,
implying that the price of curtailment contracts can be chosen once at the beginning.
3.2 Demand and Consumer Welfare
At the start of each hour-long period, the planner knows two vector-valued state variables:
w, weather forecast information; and m, the scheduled maintenance status of each generation
unit. Included in w are the time of day, the day of the week, and the time since sunrise and
sunset, since these may predict load and/or solar output. Each state (w;m) thus implies
a joint distribution of demand and solar generation as well as a probability distribution for
generator failures. Although retail price is a constant p, we need to specify the demand curve
in order to quantify the cost of system outage and the response to curtailment contracts.
We choose a very parsimonious specication for demand in order to minimize the burden
of identication. Specically, we assume that demand has a constant price elasticity  for
prices up to a reservation value, v. While the elasticity of demand is constant across states,






0; p > v
Dp ; p  v:
(1)
We assume that F D(jw) has a lower bound D
min
(w).
The term value of lost load (VOLL) is used in the electricity industry to describe the
average value of electricity per unit for customers; see Cramton and Lien [2000]. Let B(Q)
be the gross consumer benet function (area under the inverse demand curve) as a function
of quantity Q. If Q is the quantity demanded at retail price p then B(Q) = V OLL  Q.
If there is a system outage during the period then the opportunity cost of the outage is
B(Q)  doutage. VOLL and the reservation value v have a simple, monotonic relation given
the price elasticity :
Lemma 3.1. With demand specied in (1) and retail price xed at p, VOLL is constant














Proof See Online Appendix A for derivation.
Our demand model allows for a system operator that oers interruptible power contracts,
as described in Baldick et al. [2006]. In the rst stage, the system operator chooses a curtail-
ment price pc and oers contracts whereby users would agree to have their power curtailed
as necessary and be paid a net per-unit price of pc   p as compensation. At this point, all
users with valuation below pc will sign up for interruptible power contracts. In each second
stage period, knowing (w;m), the planner will choose the amount z of demand curtailment.
When demand is curtailed, the planner randomly selects customers for curtailment from the
set of customers who have signed up for interruptible power contracts and who are known to
use power at that time.15 We assume that the set of known users has mass D
min
(w).
The amount by which the planner can curtail demand in any period is limited by D
min
,
curtailment price pc, and the price elasticity of demand. Specically,
15We assume that it is not possible for the planner to curtail demand from the lowest valuation users. If
possible, this would result in more ecient rationing.












Proof See Online Appendix A for derivation.
The welfare loss function WLC(z;pc) indicates the loss in consumer benets relative to the
amount of gross consumer benet B(Q) when there is no curtailment. Note that there is
a tradeo from increasing pc. An increase in pc implies that the planner can curtail more
demand, which increases expected welfare as it allows the planner to avoid system outage.
However, an increase in pc also implies an increase in the average valuation of the curtailed
user, which decreases welfare as it increases WLC(z;pc).
3.3 Generation from Fossil Fuel and Solar PV
All new and existing fossil fuel and solar generators last from year 0 through year T. We
assume that there is a set of existing dispatchable generation units indexed by j 2 f1;:::;Jg.
At any given period, each unit has a maintenance status mj, with mj = 1 implying that the
unit is unavailable for production. Maintenance probability is exogenous in our model and
stochastic from the point of view of the system operator; let P maint
j denote the probability
of scheduled maintenance. We use data on generation unit maintenance outages to estimate
the probability that a generation unit will be unavailable due to maintenance. Observing
(w;m), the planner will schedule each available unit for production at full capacity kj or
no production; let onj denote a 0-1 indicator for scheduled production. Note that mj = 1
implies that onj = 0.
Each unit uses a particular generation technology; coal, natural gas, etc. The marginal
costs (MC) of generation for unit j are cj. The MC of fossil fuel units depend on fuel cost,
unit heat rate and costs associated with emissions. We assume that generator maintenance
and failure events are i:i:d: across generators and independent from demand.
Generators can also be used to provide operating reserves which allows them to produce
electricity in the case of the failure of another generator or load in excess of forecasted load.
11For any generator, we assume that the marginal cost of reserves is a fraction cs of the cost
of producing electricity for whatever fraction of capacity of the generator is under reserve.16
Our model of generation unit failures is based on probabilities of losing the capacity of









We allow the planner to invest in new fossil fuel generation capacity. Each of the new
fossil fuel generation units is an identical combined cycle gas generator, which the same
failure and maintenance probabilities as existing gas generators. We assume that each has
xed capacity size kFF, investment cost of FCFF per MW of capacity, and operating costs
of cFF per MWh. Knowing these values, the planner chooses the number of new generators,
nFF 2 f0;1;2;:::g. We label the new fossil fuel units j = J + 1 through j = J + nFF.
Similarly, we assume that solar PV capacity costs FCsolar per MW of installed capacity.
Solar units have zero MC and maintenance and failure probabilities; scheduled maintenance
costs are included in FCsolar. Unlike gas generators, solar PV generators are continuously
scalable. We assume that the planner is faced with a xed level of listed solar PV generation
capacity nsolar as specied by an RPS-type mandate. Solar units are not dispatchable.
Production from solar PV generation will take on a state-contingent distribution nsolarS,
where S  F S(jw) is a vector, providing multiple measures of the rate of solar output





is the number of solar output observations in an hour; generally Y = 12 as we use 5-minute
solar output data. Without loss of generality, order the solar output draws within a period so
that S
1
 :::  S
Y
;8S. Let F(jw) denote the joint distribution F D;F S of forecasted load
and solar output. This formulation allows for the possibility of correlation between forecast
16Our model of the cost of reserves is a simplication of a much more complicated problem. In reality,
there are several types of costs associated with maintaining operating reserves. Fossil fuel generation units
typically have minimum and maximum generation rates and need to be operating at or above the minimum
in order to provide operating reserve. Some high cost generation units may be operating at their minimum
so that they have excess capacity from which reserves can be provided; this implies that some lower-cost
generation units may be operating below their maximum which then implies an increase in production costs
due to reserves. Also, it may be necessary to incur start-up costs for some of these higher cost units. Finally,
units that are providing spinning reserves are not available for maintenance implying that there may be
deferred maintenance costs associated with operating reserves.
12errors for demand and for solar generation.
Even though TEP imports and exports power from the Western Interconnection, we do
not model this possibility.17 It would be problematic to model imports and exports since
the import and export market will not necessarily stay constant as other jurisdictions may
implement similar RPSs.
Finally, we discuss transmission costs. These costs may change with solar capacity because
solar capacity can be partly locally distributed, e.g. on customers' rooftops. We assume that a
fraction dsolar of solar capacity is installed in a distributed environment. We let the distributed
nature of solar production aect transmission costs in two ways. First, we assume that the
xed costs of transmission (the DPV of equipment investment and maintenance costs) are a














where AFCT is the average transmission xed cost per MW of non-distributed capacity.18
To the extent that solar production is positive in periods with the highest load, solar capacity
will lower the xed costs of transmission.
Second, we model line losses using the identity that generation plus line losses must equal
consumption. Following Borenstein [2008] and Bohn et al. [1984], we assume that line losses
from transmission in any period are equal to a constant  times the square of non-distributed
generation. Let Q be load minus demand curtailment minus distributed solar generation. If
line loss is given by LL then the quantity Q+LL is equal to total non-distributed generation.
Line loss satises LL = (Q + LL)2; let LL(Q) be the function implicitly dened by this
relationship,19
LL(Q) = (2)
 1(1   2Q  
p
1   4Q) (5)
We model line losses using (5). From (5), distributed solar production will reduce line losses,
17This assumption of not allowing imports or exports has been used in the literature that uses electric-
ity data from the Western U.S. An example is the analysis of real-time-pricing using California data; see
Borenstein and Holland [2005].
18We assume that local distribution costs are not impacted by a change in the amount of distributed solar
capacity. Local distribution costs tend to be driven by factors such as population and population density.
19There are two roots to the quadratic equation. Welfare is maximized at the smaller root.
13especially when it occurs during periods with high load.
3.4 Planner's Problem
We seek to characterize the social planner's problem of maximizing expected discounted total
surplus, subject to p and nsolar.20 In the rst stage, the planner chooses nFF and pc. In each
second-stage period, the planner makes two decisions conditional on the state (w;m) and
rst-stage decisions: (1) generator scheduling decisions on and (2) amount of demand to be
curtailed, z.
We model the choice of spinning reserves as a simplied version of how reserves are treated
in unit commitment models.21 Upon learning the state (w;m), the planner chooses onj for
each unit with mj = 0. Then, the state-specic random variables are realized. Possibly, a
system outage occurs, with a large fraction of customers not getting power. Otherwise, the
planner will adjust actual generation to be exactly equal to demand. Observing actual de-
mand and generator failure, the system operator can minimize costs by using the generators
with the lowest marginal costs to satisfy demand, leaving the generators with the highest
marginal costs as reserves. Let PC(D;x) denote the ex-post minimized costs of power gen-
eration and reserves, where D denotes demand (net of curtailment) plus line loss minus solar
production, and x denotes generator output realization vectors.
We illustrate the calculation of PC with a simple example. Consider a case with two
scheduled generators each with capacity 1, with c2 > c1, D = 1:6 and no generator failures.
Following the demand realization, the planner would partially shut down generator 2 as it
has higher costs. Thus, the total production plus reserve costs would be PC(1:6;(1;1)) =
c1 + 0:6  c2 + 0:4  c2  cs.
A system outage occurs when fossil fuel generation is less than demand minus the mini-
20Although we have developed our model using a single-agent social optimum approach, our results would
be replicated by a market-based model, similar to ERCOT. With multi-unit rms, Vickrey auctions for the
generation and reserves markets could be used to induce ecient outcomes. A Vickrey auction species that
a rm that sells k units is paid the lowest k losing oers submitted by rival rms [see Krishna, 2010].
21A unit commitment model would specify the cost of generation as well as costs of several types of reserves
for each unit: spinning reserve up (to provide for an increased rate of generation), spinning reserve down (to
provide for a reduced rate of generation), and non-spinning reserves. Bouard et al. [2005] formulate and
analyze a unit commitment model with stochastic demand. Our model is simplied in that we have a single
type of operating reserve, which is essentially both a spinning reserve up and down.
14mum solar production plus line losses, taking into account both generator failures and demand
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The planner's second-stage problem for a single period may now be dened as
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such that mj = 1 =) onj = 0:
(6)
From (6), the planner trades o the expected consumer welfare accounting for the system
outage possibility and demand curtailment (the rst line) against the production costs (the
second line). Generators can only be operated if they are not undergoing scheduled mainte-
nance (the third line).
The expected operating reserves associated with a decision are fossil fuel production plus























Extra generation in the form of operating reserves provides a \cushion" in the event that one
or more generators fail, load exceeds forecast load, and/or renewable generation falls short
of forecast renewable generation.
The planner rolls up the second-stage payos by taking the expected value of W in (6)
over all the hours in one year, and then discounting the expected annual welfare over the

















15In the rst stage the planner chooses the number of new fossil fuel units nFF and compensa-
tion pc per unit for demand curtailment to maximize TS(nFF;nsolar;pc) in (7). The amount
of solar PV generating capacity, nsolar, is constrained via RPS regulations.
4 Data, Estimation, and Computation
4.1 Data
In order to estimate and calibrate the parameters of our model, we use data from a variety
of sources. These include the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), ERCOT, TEP, FERC and NOAA. Our data pertain mostly to
the Tucson area in 2008.
We use 2008 hourly load data for the Tucson service area from a FERC Form 714 ling
by TEP. Summary statistics on load data are provided in Table 1. The peak month for
electricity demand was August, due to hot weather and high air conditioning use. March
was the month with the lowest electricity demand. Demand for electricity has grown by
roughly one percent per year in southeastern Arizona.
We draw our data on generation units serving Tucson in 2008 from several sources. The
EIA maintains a database on all existing generation units in the U.S. This database includes
information about capacity, fuel source, and location. We obtain information on heat rates
from EPA eGRID2010. This EPA database provides heat rates at the plant level, where a
plant may have multiple generation units. We assume that each generation unit at a plant
site has the same heat rate.22 The EIA also has information about capacity investment cost
for new generation units and average retail electricity price. We use information about total
line losses for TEP from UniSource [2008].
The eGRID2010 database has average annual emission rates for CO2, SO2, and NOx at
the plant level. We apply the same emission rates for each generation unit at a plant. SO2
permit fees are from the EPA's annual advance auctions for years 2011 { 2017. TEP units
22We make one exception to this assumption. We use data on heat rates at the individual generation unit
level from the 2008 EIA form 923 report for the H. Wilson Sundt Generation Plant. This plant has several
types of units with large dierences in heat rates across units. Online Appendix C provides additional details
about TEP generation facilities.
16Table 1: Summary Statistics for TEP Hourly Load (MWh), 2008
 
 
Month  Average  Standard deviation 
January  1,344  118 
February  1,314  123 
March  1,288  125 
April  1,345  182 
May  1,432  262 
June  2,041  477 
July  2,088  407 
August  2,101  408 
September  1,913  386 
October  1,597  281 
November  1,434  163 
December  1,506  144 
Number of observations:  8,784 
 
are not subject to NOx permit fees. EPA's NOx Budget Trading program, a cap and trade
program for NOx, applies to 20 eastern states, but does not apply to Arizona [see EPA, 2011].
Since our analysis is forward looking, we use information about projected future fuel costs.
EIA Form 423 contains information about the terms of multi-year fuel contracts for each of
the coal-red generators. For natural gas we use NYMEX futures prices at Henry Hub in
Louisiana [see CME, 2011]. We collect the last settlement price for each month for futures
contracts in December 2010 for delivery from January 2011 through December 2015. Our
natural gas price is the average of these prices.
We use actual solar generation data for 2008 from a solar PV test site near the Tucson
International Airport run jointly by TEP and the University of Arizona [see TEP, 2011]
and measured at the 5 minute level. This system has 24 solar PV modules with total rated
capacity of 1.536 kW.23 The modules are at a xed 30 degree tilt facing south. Summary
statistics on solar output are given in Table 2. Unlike electricity demand, solar generation
is relatively consistent throughout the year. Our data include most, but not all, hours in
2008. There are now solar PV panels available with higher eciency, and hence lower average
23These modules were produced by Uni-Solar and installed in 2003; each module has peak power of 64 W.
A 1.536 kW facility is relatively small, somewhat smaller than the size of a typical residential installation.
Solar PV panels generate electricity with roughly constant returns to scale, so we are able to use generation
data from this facility to make generation projections for a much larger facility. Also, the fact that the panels
were ve years old at the time of sampling means that the data reect to some degree the eect of aging on
solar PV generation. PV cell production declines by approximately one percent per year over the life of the
cell [see Borenstein, 2008].
17generation cost, than the panels from which our data are drawn.
A novel aspect of this project is collection and use of weather forecast data which are used
to determine the day-ahead forecasts of load and solar generation. We collect weather fore-
cast data from the National Climatic Data Center of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) [see NOAA, 2011]. The forecasts are generally at 3 a.m. for the
next day at windows of 3 hours. We interpolate to convert to hourly forecasts. Information
includes cloud cover, wind speed, temperature, relative humidity and dew point. All infor-
mation is reported as a continuous measure except for cloud cover, which is reported as one
of six discrete measures (\overcast" to \clear") each corresponding to an interval in terms of
the numerical percent of sunlight passing through. We convert cloud cover to a continuous
measure using the midpoint of the interval. Our weather forecast data is from the KTUS
NOAA weather station, which is located at the Tucson International Airport. These data
also include most, but not all, hours in 2008. Table 3 provides information on the variables
used in the weather forecast. We supplement the NOAA weather information with data on
sunrise and sunset times at the daily level [see Sunrise, 2011].
Data for generation unit outages come from the Generating Availability Data System
(GADS) of NERC. GADS includes data for outages due to maintenance and for forced out-
ages. We use GADS data for 2005-2009 for all U.S. generation units. An outage probability
is calculated as the ratio of average number of occurrences to average total available hours.
We compute maintenance outage and forced outage probabilities separately for coal units
and for natural gas units.
We obtain data on system outage durations and number of aected customers from EIA
reports on \Major Disturbances and Unusual Occurrences" in the U.S. [EIA, 2010]. Finally,
we use ERCOT auction price data to dene the costs of operating reserves.
4.2 Estimation and Calibration of Parameters
Table 4 lists the demand parameters. Short-run electricity demand is typically estimated to
be quite price inelastic { see Espey and Espey [2004] for a survey and meta-analysis. Our
value of  = 0:1 is somewhat lower than the median estimate reported in Espey and Espey
18Table 2: Summary Statistics for Tucson Solar Test Site, 2008
Month  Mean output (kWh)  Hour  Mean output (kWh) 
Jan. 2008  0.282  5 AM  0.0001 
Feb. 2008  0.325  6 AM  0.015 
Mar. 2008  0.376  7 AM  0.151 
Apr. 2008  0.403  8 AM  0.471 
May 2008  0.373  9 AM  0.792 
Jun. 2008  0.363  10 AM  1.022 
Jul. 2008  0.334  11 AM  1.145 
Aug. 2008  0.352  12 PM  1.172 
Sep. 2008  0.389  1 PM  1.128 
Oct. 2008  0.374  2 PM  0.984 
Nov. 2008  0.320  3 PM  0.752 
Dec. 2008  0.243  4 PM  0.443 
    5 PM  0.150 
    6 PM  0.020 
Rated capacity: 1.536 kW  7 PM  0.001   
Average output: 0.345 kWh  8 PM ± 4 AM  0 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Information Used in Weather Forecasts, 2008  
 
Forecast Variable  Average  Standard deviation 
Cloud cover (%)  27.7  20.0 
Temperature (ºF)  70.4  16.9 
Dew point (ºF)  36.5  15.2 
Relative humidity (%)  34.3  19.1 
Wind speed (MPH)  8.53  4.06 
Number of observations:  8,448 
 
 
19Table 4: Demand parameters
Parameter Interpretation Value Source
 Demand elasticity 0.1 Espey and Espey [2004]
p Retail price per MWh $95.6 EIA
g Demand growth factor 1.2 Based on historical rate
of demand growth
v Demand reservation value per
MWh
$11,655 Computed so that VOLL
is $8,000/MWh
F  (F D;F S) Forecastable distribution of de-
mand and solar output
Estimated
[2004], but well within their range. Our value of p is based on EIA data for Arizona in 2008.
To be consistent with the loads projected during the middle part of the life of new generation
units, we scale demand quantities by g = 1:2, based on historical rates of population and
electricity consumption growth in Arizona. The 20% growth yields non-zero investment in
new generators for all counterfactuals.
The reservation value can be recovered from (2) using numerical values for elasticity,
average price and VOLL. Using mostly customer surveys, Cramton and Lien [2000] report
estimates of VOLL that range from $1,500/MWh to $20,000/MWh. We choose a fairly
conservative estimate of VOLL=$8,000/MWh. Note that a higher VOLL estimate would
imply a higher opportunity cost of system outage and an incentive for the planner to maintain
higher reserves. We report the impact of a higher VOLL in sensitivity tests in the last part
of the paper.
We estimate F D, the relationship between day-ahead weather forecasts and load, jointly
with F S, the relationship between day-ahead weather forecasts and solar output. Speci-
cally, we estimate a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) specication with two dependent
variables, Tucson load and solar output.24 The time scale for data is ve minute intervals,
for all daytime hours (dened as the hours after sunrise until the hour past sunset) in 2008.
We replicate the hourly load dependent variable for each of the 12 periods within the hour.
We cluster standard errors at the one hour level. As solar output is zero outside of daytime
hours, we estimate a separate regression with just load, for all the other hours in 2008. For
24The estimates are equivalent to OLS since we use the same regressors for both dependent variables.
20all regressions, the regressors include the day-ahead weather forecasts and other factors that
might aect load or solar output such as the day-of-the-week. The large number of observa-
tions allows for a exible functional form for the regressors and hence we use linear splines.
For our simulations, we need to predict the joint density of solar output and the demand con-
stant D at any hour. Rather than parameterizing the joint density of residuals, we directly
simulate from this density in order to predict the joint distribution of solar output and load
at any hour. For each data element, we take 20 discrete draws from this distribution for use
in the simulation procedure. For a given load level, we recover D by inverting the demand
equation (1). For the minimum demand constant, D
min
, we use the lowest D recovered from
the 20 discrete draws. We trim the solar output at 0.
A number of studies have constructed the marginal cost of operation for generation units.
We follow the approach outlined in Wolfram [1999] and Borenstein et al. [2002]. We compute
the marginal cost of a fossil fuel generation unit as the sum of fuel cost per unit plus emissions
cost per unit. Fuel cost per unit is the product of the heat rate (MMBTU/MWh) and the
cost of fuel (in $/MMBTU). Emissions cost per unit is the product of the SO2 emission rate
and the average price for SO2 emission permits available for years 2011 { 2017.
We report summary statistics for existing TEP generators in Table 5. Except for a 5.1
MW solar PV facility in Springerville, AZ, all of TEP's generation units are fossil fuel based.
We treat this solar unit as though it were producing constantly at its mean output level
of 0.756 MWh. We believe that the bias from not modeling the output of this unit more
accurately will be small, given its relatively small size.
Table 5 also lists characteristics of potential new generators. We use a relatively small
generator capacity size of kFF = 60 MW, as the small size is close to the average size of 51.3
MW for TEP's gas generators and hence likely reects the optimal generator size for a rela-
tively small market such as southeastern Arizona. We assume that the other characteristics
of new generators are the same as for TEP's existing combined cycle gas generators, which
are all at the Luna Energy Facility. This facility began operating in 2006 and reects modern
technology.
Table 6 lists the remaining supply parameters. The solar capacity cost includes the
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Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. MC figures include emissions permits. 
 
  expected discounted present value of costs for maintenance including inverters over the life of
the unit. We compute the ratio of the hourly reserve marginal cost to the hourly generation
marginal cost, cs, using data from the deregulated ERCOT market on the 2008 prices in the
up-regulation and responsive reserve markets, which pay rms in exchange for giving ERCOT
the option to force them to operate with short notice.25 If they operate, they receive the price
on the balancing market. The average price is $65.41/MWh in the balancing (production)
market; $27.05 in the responsive reserve market; and $22.71 in the up regulation market.
The average of the ratio of the responsive reserve market to balancing market prices over all
hours is 0.42, while the average of the ratio of the up regulation to balancing market prices
over all hours is 0.40. Our estimate of the reserve costs is the average of these two numbers.
We estimate transmission cost savings from solar as follow. The Arizona RPS states
that 30% of solar energy must be generated in a distributed environment which motivates
our choice of dsolar. For line losses, we nd the value of  that matches TEP's reported
line losses of 6.6% of 2008 load, using LL(Q) to calculate line loss as a function of  in
25We obtained the data from ERCOT [2011]. The up regulation market gives rms 3 to 5 seconds to adjust
production while the responsive reserve market gives 10 minutes.
22Table 6: Remaining supply parameters
Param. Interpretation Value Source
doutage system outage hours times per-
cent of aected customers
0.98 EIA
dsolar Fraction of solar generation that
is distributed
0.3 Arizona RPS
FCFF New gas generator capital cost
per MW
$984,000 EIA
FCsolar Solar capital cost per rated MW $5,000,000 EIA
cs Ratio of MC for spinning re-
serves to production MC
0.41 Calculated from ERCOT data
 Line loss constant 0.000035 Calculated fromTEP Form 10K
AFCT Average transmission xed cost $19.6 Borenstein and Holland [2005],
Baughman and Bottaro [1976],
TEP line loss cost
 Discount factor 0.94
T Lifetime of generators in years 25
any period and then summing across periods in 2008 to get total line losses as a function
of . To calculate AFCT, we approximate average generating costs by $70/MWh, so that
the 6.6 percent line loss represents $4.62/MWh. We dierence the line loss from the total
transmission and distribution (T&D) cost of $40/MWh from Borenstein and Holland [2005]
to obtain an average T&D xed cost of $35.38/MWh. Using information in Baughman and
Bottaro [1976] we calculate that 55.3% of T&D xed cost can be attributed to transmission.
We obtain AFCT in (4) by multiplying 55.3% of $35.38 by the discounted sum of expected
load and then dividing by the maximum expected load.
To estimate doutage we use major disturbances reported by the EIA whose causes were
due to equipment failure (not, for example, due to storms) that impacted more than 50,000
customers. For 2008 there were 21 such disturbances for which we could nd both the total
number of customers and the number of aected customers, from which we calculate the
percent of customers aected. For each of the 21, we multiplied the duration by the percent
of customers aected. We estimate doutage as the mean of this product.
234.3 Computation of Planner's Problem
We compute solutions to the planner's problem using the estimated and calibrated model
parameters. We assume that the distribution of forecasted load for TEP remains constant
at its 2008 level over time, adjusted by the 20% growth factor. We proceed by maximizing
the DPV of welfare over the rst stage decisions of the number of new gas generators and
the curtailment price, taking as given the retail price of electricity and the solar output level.
For each rst stage decision vector, we compute the optimal policy for each second stage
period, and the value that results from this optimal policy. The computation of the rst
stage involves a grid search over nFF. For each value of nFF, we search over pc using the
simplex method.
To compute the second stage optimal policy, we make two assumptions to ease the com-
putational burden that we believe will not signicantly bias the results. First, we assume
that the planner schedules generators in ascending order of MC when computing optimal
generation for a second-stage period. Although this point is intuitively reasonable, because
of dierences in sizes and failure probabilities across generators, it is possible that a planner
would want to schedule a higher MC generator and not a lower MC one. Second, we assume
that the planner curtails demand only if all available generators for which MC is below the
marginal cost of curtailment, dWLC(z)=dz, are scheduled. Again, this point is intuitively
reasonable but may not hold exactly because generators come in discrete chunks.
We now discuss our computation of the second-stage policies. At each second-stage period,
we condition on the state (w;m), which encapsulates the units with planned outages and the
joint forecastable distribution of load and solar generation. We then choose the production
and curtailment decisions, integrating over remaining sources of uncertainty (forced outages
and the realization of load and solar generation given the forecastable distribution) in order
to solve for the probability of system outage and the associated expected welfare. We then
maximize expected welfare over these choices. Finally, we integrate over the three ex-ante
decisions to obtain the expected welfare associated with any rst stage policy.
We perform the integration using simulation. Specically, we use 20 discrete draws to
24integrate over the joint distribution of load and solar generation conditional on a forecast.
Each of the 20 draws includes one hourly load draw and 12 5-minute solar output draws. Note
that the planner's problem also involves simulation of generator failures. Failure probabilities
for individual generation units are small, and probabilities of multiple failures { which might
cause a system outage { are very small, but the adverse consequences of a system outage are
very large. Thus, our computation is challenging because integration using a direct simulation
method would be very inecient. Instead, for each type of generator, we integrate over
the probability of a given number of failures given a total number of generators operating,
and then simulate the identity of failed generators conditional on the number of failures.
Similarly, at the rst stage, we need to integrate over the distribution (w;m). We integrate
over the forecastable weather distribution by simulating with replacement from the observed
distribution and over generator scheduled maintenance with an analogous method to our
simulation for sudden generator failure.
5 Results
5.1 Forecast Estimation Results
The estimated relationship from the SUR model of daytime load and solar output on weather
forecasts is reported in Table 7. The unit of observation is the 5-minute level although load
and all regressors are the same within an hour. Standard errors are clustered at the hour
level. We estimate splines for each regressor. For cloud coverage, the knots of the splines
correspond to the categorical cloud cover variable in weather forecasts. For other forecast
variables, we use 10 splines where the knots are the deciles of the distribution. We report
coecients on the lowest, median and highest levels. We also include month, hour and
day-of-week dummies, as well as interactions of cloud cover with other variables.
We nd a U-shaped relation between forecasted temperature and load, as electricity
is needed for both heating and cooling. Another important predictor for load is relative
humidity, where the relation is inverse U-shaped. On the other hand, the coecients of
temperature on solar output suggest that increases in temperature in the upper deciles have
no signicant impact on solar output. Forecasted cloud cover variables have negative signs
25and of increasing absolute value on solar output, as expected. Hours since sunrise before noon
and hours until sunset after noon are also both strong positive predictors of solar output.
The R2 is 0.967 for load and 0.831 for solar output, suggesting that both levels are highly,
though not perfectly, forecastable. The correlation in the residuals between load and solar
output is 0.077 and statistically signicant (2(1) = 298;P < 0:01). The nighttime impact
of weather forecast on load is reported in Table 8. Temperature is an important predictor
for nighttime demand as are hourly dummies.
The outage probabilities for gas and coal generators are reported in Table 9. Note that coal
generators report a higher rate of sudden failure (0.123%) than do gas generators (0.054%).
5.2 Equilibrium Costs of Solar RPS Policies
Table 10 reports equilibrium computational results using the estimated and calibrated pa-
rameters, gross of the benet from reduced CO2 emissions (which we address below in Sec-
tion 5.4). The rst column reports results with no solar PV investment and other columns
progressively add higher RPS requirements up to 30%.26
Without solar PV investment, the planner chooses 32 new natural gas generation units.
Demand curtailment accounts for 0.8% of operating reserves although at peak times such as
July at noon, the probability of some demand curtailment is over 13 percent. On average over
all hours, operating reserves are 24.2 percent of load. The 24.2 percent gure for operating
reserves appears to be higher than average actual reserves for many systems. Two factors
might account for this. First, there may be room for improvement in our forecasting model
for load and solar. A better forecasting model (with additional explanatory variables and/or
a dierent specication) could yield a lower variance for forecast errors and lead to lower
optimal operating reserves. Second, TEP has a relatively small number of generation units
and its largest units comprise a signicant fraction of load. For instance, TEP would need
to have operating reserves amounting to 19% of average load to replace the output of its two
largest coal units.
The second column of numbers in Table 10 reports results for a solar RPS of 10% of load.
26Arizona species a 15% RPS by 2025 while California species a 33% RPS by 2020.
26Table 7: Estimation of Daytime Load and Solar Output Forecasts  
  Load (MWh)  Solar output (Wh) 
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Temp × cloud  –0.09      (1.6)  7.8*      (3.4)  
RH × cloud   3.5*      (1.5)  1.9      (3.6) 
Wind × cloud    3.1*      (1.4)  –12.1**   (3.9) 
Dew × cloud   –3.9*      (1.9)  6.4      (4.0) 
6AM dummy    –541**   (88) 
…     
12PM dummy   261**     (48)  –107**   (24) 
…     
6PM dummy  33*      (17)  –276**   (77.187) 
R–squared  0.967  0.831 
Correlation of 
residuals  0.077** 
Note: Model estimated with a SUR specification. Unit of observation is 5 minute 
interval in 2008. Standard errors are clustered at hour level. Number of 
observations is 50,124. We include as regressors day-of-week and month-of-year 
indicators and full sets of spline coefficients.  
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
* Statistically significant at 5% level  
27Table 8: Estimation of Nighttime Load Forecast
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Temperature × cloud cover  –6.6**     (1.9) 
Relative humidity × cloud   –1.2      (1.2) 
Wind × cloud cover   9.3**    (1.5) 
Dew point × cloud cover   5.2*     (2.0) 
   
9PM dummy  272**    (5.1) 
…   
3AM dummy   –58.0**   (3.7) 
 
R–squared  0.959 
 
Note: Model estimated with OLS. Unit of observation is 5 minute 
interval in 2008. Standard errors are clustered at hour level. Number of 
observations is 48,852. We include as regressors day-of-week and month-
of-year indicators and full sets of spline coefficients.  
** Statistically significant at 1% level 
* Statistically significant at 5% level 







Natural gas generator 0.0535% 0.0395% 358
(0.122%) (0.105%)
Coal generator 0.123% 0.049% 866
(0.119%) (0.075%)
Note: The time period covered is 2005-2009. Standard errors in parentheses.
28Table 10: Outcomes with Dierent RPS Levels
RPS Policy 0% 10% 15% 20% 30%
Solar PV capacity (MW) 0 846 1,269 1,692 2,538
Solar production (1000 MWh/year) 0 1,701 2,551 3,401 5,102
Load (1000 MWh / year) 17,006 17,006 17,006 17,006 17,006
New 60MW natural gas generators (#) 32 29 29 28 27
Foregone new gas generators (#) { 3 3 4 5
Scheduled non-solar prod. + res. (1000
MWh/year)
22,942 21,817 21,438 21,081 20,422
Realized non-solar prod. + reserves
(1000 MWh/year)
22,924 21,799 21,420 21,064 20,404
Reserves as % of power consumed 24.2% 28.0% 30.8% 33.9% 40.2%
Average system outage prob. 4.45e-5 5.29e-5 5.26e-5 6.11e-5 6.94e-5
Curtailment price pc ($/MWh) 408 577 551 717 722
Total curtailment quan. (MWh/year) 33,485 27,033 21,771 25,453 30,804
Prob. of some curtailment Jul. 12PM 13.0% 0.04% 8.0e-5% 7.2e-7% 8.9e-8%
Prob. of some curtailment Jul. 6PM 13.0% 25.9% 29.1% 22.7% 29.3%
Production costs (million $/year) 549.2 481.6 450.7 422.0 375.6
Reserve costs (million $/year) 76.4 85.2 91.3 97.5 106.9
Gas generator investment costs (mil. $) 1,889 1,712 1,712 1,653 1,594
Solar capacity investment costs (mil. $) 0 4,229 6,344 8,458 12,688
Transmission FC (million $/year) 332.7 326.0 324.5 323.0 319.9
Transmission line losses (1000
MWh/year)
1,482 1,386 1,342 1,298 1,217
Loss in surplus relative to baseline (mil-
lion $/year)
{ 236.1 364.4 496.2 768.0
Loss in surplus per unit solar production
($/MWh)
{ 138.8 142.9 145.9 150.5
NOx emissions (1000 metric tons / year) 20.9 20.5 20.1 19.6 18.4
SO2 emissions (1000 metric tons / year) 14.3 13.9 13.7 13.2 12.5
CO2 emissions (mill. metric tons / year) 18.9 18.0 17.4 16.9 15.8
29This output level would require 846 MW of solar PV capacity, with an investment cost of $4.4
billion. The solar PV panels would yield roughly 1.7 million MWh per year, which represents
a capacity factor (i.e., average output as a percent of capacity) of 23%. Optimal new fossil
fuel generators falls by 3, reducing fossil fuel generation capacity by 180 MW. This yields a
capital cost oset of $177 million (about 4% of solar investment cost). Optimal operating
reserves rise compared to the no-solar case, from 24.2% to 28.0% of electricity consumed.
Under the no RPS case, the planner chooses a curtailment price of $408/MWh, which is
4.3 times the retail price.27 With the 10% RPS, the optimal curtailment price rises, as it is
optimal to be able to curtail more demand in periods of low solar output and high demand.
The times when curtailment occur shift as a result of the RPS. For instance, the probability
of demand curtailment at noon in July drops, as solar output is high, but the probability of
curtailment at 6PM in July { when solar output is low but load is still high { rises. Overall,
total curtailment is lower than without solar.
Interestingly, the system outage probability rises by only a modest amount as the RPS
standard is increased. The overall impact of a 10% RPS standard is to reduce expected
welfare over the life of the units by about $236 million per year, gross of the value of CO2
emissions reduction. Dividing by solar production, the reduction in welfare is $138.8/MWh
of electricity produced, again gross of the CO2 emissions reduction. Put dierently, the net
welfare cost of the solar mandate is approximately 75 percent of the $4.2 billion investment
cost for solar PV capacity. These results factor in the value of SO2 emission reductions to
the extent that SO2 permit prices reect marginal environmental damages.
Columns 3 through 5 in Table 10 report results for solar RPS policies of 15%, 20%, and
30% of load, respectively. There is little or no oset in fossil fuel capacity investment as the
RPS is increased above 10% but otherwise, the welfare and cost results move in the same
direction as the change from 0 to 10%. Because of the lack of fossil fuel capacity oset and
the fact that solar generation will increasingly substitute from low cost fossil fuel generators,
the welfare loss per MWh of solar generation rises monotonically from $138.8 to $150.5 as
27Baldick et al. [2006] note that compensation per MWh for curtailed demand in interruptible power
contracts ranges from about 1.5 to 6 times higher than average retail price.
30the RPS increases from 10% to 30%.
Comparisons between solar PV and conventional generation are often based on levelized
cost, which is the average cost over the life of the unit.28 The realized solar output and
our assumption about the cost of solar panels together yield a levelized cost of $184/MWh
for solar PV generation. The levelized cost for a new combined cycle generation unit is
$58/MWh.29 Thus, on the basis of a simple average cost comparison, solar PV imposes an
additional per unit cost of $126/MWh. The levelized cost dierence does not account for the
time-prole of generation or endogenize the choice of planner policies in response to a solar
mandate.
Borenstein [2008] makes the point that valuing solar PV generation using wholesale prices
at the time of generation narrows the gap between solar PV and conventional generation due
to the time-prole of solar generation. Our analysis takes into account the value of solar
generation at dierent times of day and in dierent seasons, just as in Borenstein [2008].
However, in the case of large-scale renewable mandates, it is also important to consider the
impact of the mandate on optimal system-wide policies, including operating reserves, backup
fossil fuel capacity and demand-side management through curtailment contracts.30
Our analysis endogenizes these three factors and nds that, together with the Borenstein
eect, they imply that, for a 20% RPS standard, solar is $19.9/MWh more costly than the
levelized cost dierence. In contrast, if the planner did not re-optimize in response to a 20%
RPS (and instead used the same operating reserve quantity, backup fossil fuel capacity, and
curtailment quantity and price), we calculate that the mandate would have a welfare eect
of $1,378/MWh. This very high gure is due to the fact that the 20% RPS would then result
in a 3% probability of system outage. Thus, with sub-optimal policies, the costs of renewable
energy can indeed be much higher.
31Table 11: Costs Associated with 20% RPS
RPS policy Foregone new gas gener-
ators
Loss in surplus per
MWh solar
Feasible solar 4 $145.9
Solar cost drop from $5 to $2/W 4 $35.5
No unforecastable variance 7 $133.4
Equal generation prole 7 $131.4
Fully dispatchable 27 $89.8
VOLL increased to $12,000 3 $146.2
No demand curtailment 0 $149.4
Rule of thumb policy 1 $677.2
\Equal generation prole" is a hypothetical solar facility which produces equally at every hour.
\Fully dispatchable" is a hypothetical solar facility which can be dispatched based on the demand forecast.
\No unforecastable variance" is a hypothetical solar facility that produces at the forecastable mean.
5.3 Components of Equilibrium Costs for Solar
Table 11 evaluates further the causes of the equilibrium costs of solar for the 20% RPS case.
Each row corresponds to one scenario (which was column 5 in Table 10). We omit most of
the detail from Table 10, presenting only two columns for each experiment: the foregone new
gas generators and loss in surplus.
For reference, the rst row repeats the baseline 20% case from Table 10. The second row
simulates dropping the cost of solar from $5 to $2/W as many industry observers believe
will occur. Note that optimal policies for the system operator remain unchanged with this
drop in capacity cost; the reduction in surplus loss per MWh of solar is due only to reduced
up-front capacity cost. The loss in surplus from solar drops dramatically in this case, from
$145.9 to $35.5.
The next four rows examine the impact of dierent components of intermittency on the
equilibrium costs of solar. First, we nd that eliminating the unforecastable component of
solar output raises value by $12.5/MWh relative to the base case, from $145.9 to $133.4.
The planner foregoes 3 extra generators in this case. This drop is small compared to the
overall additional equilibrium cost of solar generation and is less than drops reported in the
28See EIA [2011]
29See EIA [2011].
30The envelope theorem implies that it is not necessary to re-optimize policies with only a small amount
of solar on the grid.
32literature.31 This may be in part because other studies have not fully endogenized policies
in response to renewable energy mandates. Relatedly, utilities often express concern over
the high cost of intermittency with large-scale solar. We believe that this may be because
utilities do not fully understand the optimal policies in the case of large-scale solar.
Second, we nd that a hypothetical solar facility that always produced at its mean output
level would be better than the baseline { with a loss of $131.4 instead of $145.9/MWh. The
planner foregoes 3 extra generators in this case. Moreover, the equal generation case would
be better than even the case without unforecastable intermittency, by $2.0. Thus, even
though solar facilities tend to produce during peak periods, even the forecastable part of
their intermittency reduces their value.
Third, we examine the value of solar if its energy could be dispatched at the times with
the highest demand, as might occur with perfect storage mechanisms. In this case, the value
of solar would rise by $56.1/MWh relative to the base case { a substantial amount, but much
less than the over $100 rise from reducing solar capacity costs to $2/W.
The next two rows test the robustness of our ndings to the demand curtailment speci-
cation and VOLL measures, respectively. A 50% increase in VOLL has virtually no eect
on the value of solar PV. However, if the system operator is constrained to zero demand
curtailment then the optimal number of new fossil fuel generators decreases by three instead
of four from the no solar to the solar case. In eect, the system operator replaces demand
curtailment with the additional generators. Eliminating demand curtailment reduces the
value of solar by $3.5/MWh.
The nal row of Table 10 compares the optimal policy with a rule of thumb policy similar
to what has been proposed in some studies of renewable intermittency.32 Our rule of thumb
policy starts with the no-solar policy and modies it in two ways. First, we reduce fossil
31For 20% wind power penetration in Great Britain, Skea et al. [2008] calculate that the back-up generation
capacity required to address intermittency would add roughly 15% to the cost of wind generation. Ho et al.
[2008] estimates that back-up generation capacity required to address solar intermittency would represent
about 15% of solar PV average cost. These studies do not consider costs of additional operating reserves that
might be required.
32Madaeni and Sioshansi [2011] examine the impact of changes in wind forecast accuracy. Operating
reserves are constrained to be greater than or equal to a xed fraction of load throughout their analysis.
Mills and Wiser [2010] examine how operating reserve costs change depending on the degree of variability of
solar generation. They set operating reserves equal to a xed percentile of the distribution of period-to-period
changes in solar generation.
33fuel capacity by a \capacity credit" for solar PV capacity of 388 MW, which is equal to
the solar PV capacity factor (23%) times solar capacity of 1,692 MW. Second, we increase
operating reserves by a xed amount to address solar intermittency, with a corresponding
addition to fossil fuel capacity. We adopt the heuristic for operating reserves proposed by
Mills and Wiser [2010], who suggest increasing reserves by three standard deviations of the
change in solar from one period to the next.33 The welfare cost of this rule of thumb policy is
$482.5/MWh; 2.8 times higher than the welfare cost associated with optimal policies. This
comparison illustrates the importance of policy optimization.
Figure 3 shows how the intermittency costs decrease as the time scale for solar output
observations increases. As reported in Table 11, the 5 minute data imply unforecastable
intermittency costs of $12.5/MWh. With 60 minute data, we calculate the costs to be only
$4.2/MWh.34 Thus, it is the high frequency nature of the solar intermittency that is the
most problematic. The results also suggest that data at an even ner level than 5 minutes
may give an even higher cost to solar.
33We compute the standard deviation of 5 minute changes in solar generation. Three standard deviations
amounts to 287 MW. Thus, we add 287 MWh of operating reserves to optimal baseline operating reserves
for all daylight hours, and adjust fossil fuel capacity downward by 388   287 MW.
34Our results on the impact of the solar generation time scale are roughly consistent with results in Mills
and Wiser [2010]. Using a heuristic decision rule for operating reserves, they nd that operating reserves
required to address variability of solar PV generation for a single site at a one minute time scale are three
times as costly as operating reserves required to address solar PV generation variability at a one hour time
scale. Mills and Wiser [2010] also nd that geographic dispersion of solar PV sites signicantly reduces
intermittency costs.
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345.4 RPS Policies and Benets from CO2 Reductions
Finally, we analyze whether RPS policies would increase or decrease social welfare, when
one accounts for the reduction in CO2 emissions that would be caused by the RPS. The
policy impact of an RPS depends crucially on two elements: rst, on the environmental
benet per unit reduction in CO2 emissions; and second, on the impact of ongoing R&D in
reducing the costs of renewable power generation. Note that we can derive the cost of CO2
emission reductions under current technological conditions from Table 10. For example, CO2
is reduced by 2.3 million tons per year at a cost of $216/ton for the 20% RPS case.
The U.S. government has recently set social cost of carbon values to be used in the regula-
tory approval process. They specify a range of values corresponding to dierent assumptions
about discount rates, the impact of temperature change, and loss functions. The central
value is $21/(metric) ton in 2007 dollars. We use the four values developed by the U.S.
government as well as a baseline of $0.35 Using these values, we calculate the \target" cost
of solar capacity generation at which the RPS policy would be welfare neutral. The RPS will
be welfare increasing if and only if solar capacity costs are lower than the target costs.
Table 12 presents the results, which can be derived without recomputing the model, since
solar capital costs enter linearly into welfare. At the current cost of $5/W, any RPS would
reduce welfare even if CO2 emissions are valued at the highest reported gure of $65/ton.
At this emissions cost, solar capital costs would have to fall to $2.18 for the 10% RPS to be
welfare neutral, and $2.00 for the 30% RPS to be welfare neutral. As one would expect, the
target capital costs are increasing in the value of oset CO2 emissions. For instance, the 20%
RPS welfare neutral capital costs rise from $1.04 to $2.10, as CO2 emissions costs increase
from $0 to $65.
Less evident is the impact of an increase of an RPS on the welfare neutral capacity
cost. On one hand, with a higher RPS, solar capacity will substitute more from lower cost
generators, which will decrease its equilibrium value. On the other hand, the lower cost
generators will tend to be coal instead of gas, and coal generators emit more than double the
35These values appear in EPA [2010]. See also Greenstone et al. [2011] for details on this policy. Tol [2005]
provides a survey of estimates of the social cost of carbon and obtains similar numbers.
35Table 12: Welfare Neutral Solar PV Capital Costs with Benets from CO2 Reductions
RPS Policy 10% 15% 20% 30%
Benet per ton of CO2 reduction
$0 1.23 1.12 1.04 0.91
$5 1.30 1.20 1.12 1.00
$21 1.54 1.45 1.38 1.26
$35 1.74 1.67 1.61 1.50
$65 2.18 2.14 2.10 2.00
Note: solar capital costs are in dollars per rated watt
CO2 per unit energy output than combined cycle natural gas units (see Table 5), which will
increase its value. Under the social optimum, the generation cost eect dominates, but not
by very much. For instance, for the central $21 CO2 cost case, the welfare neutral capacity
costs fall from $1.54 to $1.26 from the 10% to 30% RPS cases.
6 Conclusions
A variety of current and potential policies are intended to stimulate investment in renewable
energy generation. Intermittency of renewable generation may have a signicant impact on
electric grid reliability, system operations, and requirements for back-up generation capacity.
Because a grid operator must make dierent long- and short-run decisions in response to
intermittent renewable output, we believe that the costs of intermittency can best be under-
stood in the context an optimizing or equilibrium model. Thus, we developed an empirical
approach to estimate the equilibrium costs of renewable energy accounting for their inter-
mittent nature. Our approach has three parts: (1) a theoretical model that is based on the
work of Joskow and Tirole [2007]; (2) a process to estimate and calibrate the parameters of
this model using publicly-available data; and (3) a computational approach to evaluate the
impact of counterfactual RPS and other policies. We believe that the biggest limitations of
our approach are that we do not allow for dynamic linkages from period to period; that we
consider only the social optimum; and that we do not model imports and exports outside the
local area. Moreover, other of our assumptions, notably our assumed spinning reserve costs,
are at best approximations of reality.
Using our approach, we examined the impact of a renewable portfolio standard (RPS) on
36Tucson Electric Power, the public utility that serves southeastern Arizona. We nd that the
equilibrium cost of a 20 percent solar PV RPS would be $145.9/MWh. Perfectly dispatchable
solar energy would lower costs by $56.1/MWh. Unforecastable intermittency accounts for
$12.5/MWh and high frequency unforecastable intermittency within an hour is the most
costly part of this. If CO2 reductions are valued at $21/ton, a 20% RPS would be welfare
increasing if solar capacity costs dropped below $1.38/W from their current level of $5/W.
We believe that our study has a number of broader implications beyond the results for
solar generation in Arizona. First, our nding that the costs of intermittency for solar energy
are lower than many industry observers believe may be important. In particular, costs
associated with intermittency are a relatively small component of the overall welfare cost
of a solar RPS mandate; the bulk of the welfare cost is simply the high installation cost of
solar. Our results on intermittency stem from the fact that our approach calculates the costs
if utilities use forecasts to optimally schedule reserves, design demand curtailment contracts,
and build capacity in response to solar PV mandates. It is possible that utilities need to
obtain knowledge about how these decisions should change in the presence of substantial
renewable generation, and our study provides a framework that can be used to guide utilities
along this dimension.
Second, we believe that our study has implications about the optimality of dierent
potential RPS policies. While we nd that an immediate RPS with 2008 technology would
reduce welfare, we also nd that once solar capacity costs drop below $2.00 or $1.50, solar
PV generation becomes welfare increasing. More surprisingly, at this point, capacity costs
do not have to drop much further before it is optimal for solar to account for a signicant
proportion of generation in Arizona.
Finally, we believe that our approach can be used to analyze a variety of other energy
policies many of which might also have important equilibrium impacts. These policies include
understanding the impact of real-time pricing on reducing GhG emissions and intermittency
costs; the relative costs of reducing emissions from an RPS versus a carbon tax; how geo-
graphically disparate wind or solar installations might lower intermittency costs; and how
technologies such as battery storage and electric cars which change the eective time pattern
37of demand can change the value of renewable mandates.
Appendix A Proofs
For Online Publication
Proof of Lemma 3.1
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Dividing through by Dp , we obtain the expression in the statement of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3.2
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Note that D drops out of the welfare cost, which depends on the state only through the
quantity z of rationing chosen at that state.
Appendix B System Operations
For Online Publication
The electricity system is a multi-nodal network that connects a number of dierent types
of generation plants to load centers (e.g., cities) via high-voltage transmission lines and
ultimately delivers power to customers via lower voltage distribution lines. Since storage is
very limited on most systems, the supply of power must equal (almost exactly) the demand
for power, called load, on a real time basis. Moreover, load can vary unpredictably over
the course of a day (e.g., due to weather changes) and available supply can vary quickly and
38unpredictably due to equipment malfunction or breakdown and due to intermittent renewable
generation. To ensure matching of supply and demand, the manager of an electricity grid
engages in \system operations." System operations involve control of generators, decisions
about rationing power to customers, and control of backup systems. The system operator
insures reliability in part by having generators available on a stand-by basis so that customers
can continue to be served in the event that one or more generators fails and/or load exceeds
forecast. Operating reserves consist of generation capacity that is scheduled by the system
operator over and above the amount required to serve forecasted load. Operating reserves
are part of a set of ancillary services used by the system operator to regulate voltage and
maintain stability of the system. It is common for ancillary network-support services to
require scheduling generation capacity equal to 10-12 percent of load at any point in time.36
If available electricity supply is not sucient to meet demand then a system operator will
typically shut o power to some customers or some geographic areas, resulting in a partial
blackout of the system. This is what we refer to as a system outage. The system operator
initiates an involuntary cut-o of power to some customers, so as to avoid a complete system
collapse. A total system collapse is a rare outcome in which demand and generation are shut
o over a large area in an uncontrolled fashion.37 A system collapse should not occur if the
system operator responds appropriately to a power shortage by cutting o power to some
customers.
In the absence of coordination by a system operator, the operator of a generation unit may
impose externalities on other suppliers and on consumers. This is because a power generator
may not face the additional cost of being the marginal producer that is causing the system
to have to shut out users or, in some cases, completely collapse [see Joskow and Tirole, 2007].
This externality problem is potentially larger with more intermittency problems, suggesting
that the role of the system operator may be more important with more renewable energy.
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), an industry trade group,
36Joskow and Tirole [2007], p. 78.
37An example was the 2003 blackout in the Northeast U.S. and Ontario in which 50 million customers lost
power [Minkel, 2008]. In this case, a transmission line fault led to deviations in network frequency, causing
generators and transmission lines to trip out in a cascading fashion, which led to a blackout over a large area.
39has developed a set of standards for safe and reliable operation of the electric grid. These
standards cover many aspects of grid operations, including management of operating re-
serves.38 NERC standards are aimed at achieving a level of reliability such that a loss of load
occurs no more than one day in ten years. NERC Standard BAL-002-0 deals with what is
termed \Disturbance Control Performance." This standard dictates the amount of reserve
capacity that is to be available in the event of a loss of supply (typically from failure of a
generator). Two key provisions of this standard are:
1. The Balancing Authority shall carry at least enough reserve to cover the most severe
single contingency (e.g., failure of the largest generation unit in operation).
2. The maximum amount of time permitted for recovery from a disturbance is 15 min-
utes.39
The NERC standards were approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
in 2007 and are now mandatory for electric utilities in the U.S.
All electric grids have operating reserves, although there is variation in their management
across grids. We have limited information about how TEP manages operating reserves but
more information from the Electricity Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), which covers
most of the state of Texas. ERCOT operates in a deregulated framework in which there
is competition both in the wholesale market and among retail service providers. Wholesale
electricity service is traded via bilateral contracts and in an energy balancing spot mar-
ket. However, even in ERCOT's deregulated framework, there is a system operator that is
responsible for managing operating reserves so as to maintain reliability.
The ERCOT system operator runs auctions to procure operating reserves from generation
suppliers for several categories of reserves. ERCOT utilizes four main types of ancillary
services [see Baldick and Niu, 2005]: (1) Up Regulation Service; (2) Responsive Reserve
Services; (3) Non-spinning Reserves; and (4) Down Regulation Service. The rst three of
these services pay rms in exchange for giving ERCOT the option to force them to operate
38See, NERC [2011].
39The recovery period is dened as the amount of time it takes to return the area control error to the
minimum of zero and its pre-disturbance value.
40with short notice. If they are forced to operate, they then receive the market price on the
balancing market. These three services dier mostly in the length of time which they have to
increase production. The shortest is the Up Regulation, which allows rms 3 to 5 seconds to
adjust production, and the longest is non-spinning reserves, which allows an hour to adjust.
Down Regulation service pays rms that are operating generation units for giving ERCOT
the option to reduce their rate of generation. ERCOT would exercise this option when
demand is lower than expected. ERCOT conducts these ancillary service markets one day
ahead and operates one auction for each service category for each hour.
Appendix C Electricity Provision in
southeastern Arizona
For Online Publication
Most people in southeastern Arizona live in the Tucson metropolitan area, which is one of
the best locations in the U.S. for solar electricity generation, as evidenced by the solar ra-
diation map in Figure 4. Electricity service is provided by Tucson Electric Power (TEP),
a vertically integrated, investor-owned utility that is regulated by the Arizona Corporation
Commission (ACC). TEP's service territory covers 1,155 square miles and includes a popu-
lation of approximately one million in the greater Tucson metropolitan area.40 Retail energy
consumption by customer class in 2008 was distributed as follows: 41 percent residential, 21
percent commercial, and 38 percent industrial and public. Copper mining is the largest in-
dustrial user of electricity, accounting for about one-third of industrial consumption. Tucson
is a summer peaking system, with very hot summers and high usage of air conditioning. The
highest load in 2008 was 3,063 MWh for 3-4 p.m., August 1.
Tucson is situated within the Western Interconnection, the electrical grid that encom-
passes the Western U.S. and part of Western Canada. TEP is responsible for system op-
erations and for scheduling generation and transmission power ows within its balancing
authority area, which covers most of southeastern Arizona. At dierent times, TEP both
40Detailed information about TEP customers and operations are found in the 2008 10-K annual report for
UniSource Energy Corp., TEP's parent company; [see UniSource, 2008].
41Figure 4: Photovoltaic Solar Resource: Source www.NREL.gov
imports and exports power over the Western Interconnection. As of the end of 2008, TEP
owned or leased generation units with total capacity of 2,222 MW. This capacity is virtually
all powered by fossil fuel.41 The primary sources for data for TEP generators are described
in Section 4.1. Most of these generators are wholly owned and controlled by TEP. However,
TEP has a partial ownership stake in the Luna Energy natural gas plant and in the Navajo,
Four Corners, and San Juan coal plants [see TEP's FERC Form 714 ling and UniSource,
2008]. For our analysis, we specify the generation capacity for each unit at a jointly owned
plant as total unit capacity times TEP's plant ownership share.
TEP is subject to a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), mandated by the ACC, which
calls for an increasing fraction of load to be generated from renewable sources until 15 percent
of load is from renewables by 2025. For 2008 the RPS was 1.75 percent. TEP satises the
41Other utilities in Arizona own and operate non-fossil fuel generation plants. The Salt River Project has
several hydroelectric plants. Arizona Public Service operates the nation's largest nuclear generator, Palo
Verde. There is some wind generation in Arizona. However, wind is not expected by be a major source of
renewable generation in the state.
42RPS through a combination of its own solar PV generation, wholesale purchases of renewable
energy, distributed solar generation by its customers, and retirement of banked renewable
energy credits. Many TEP customers have solar PV panels at their business or residence.
However, total distributed solar PV capacity in TEP's service territory was only 2.7 MW as
of the end of 2008.42
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